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Abstract—Malware applications typically
use a command and control (C&C) server
to manage bots to perform malicious activi-
ties. Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs)
are popular methods for generating pseudo-
random domain names that can be used to
establish a communication between an in-
fected bot and the C&C server. In recent
years, machine learning based systems have
been widely used to detect DGAs. There are
several well known state-of-the-art classifiers
in the literature that can detect DGA domain
names in real-time applications with high
predictive performance. However, these DGA
classifiers are highly vulnerable to adversarial
attacks in which adversaries purposely craft
domain names to evade DGA detection clas-
sifiers.
In our work, we focus on hardening DGA
classifiers against adversarial attacks. To this
end, we train and evaluate state-of-the-art
deep learning and random forest (RF) classi-
fiers for DGA detection using side information
that is harder for adversaries to manipulate
than the domain name itself. Additionally, the
side information features are selected such
that they are easily obtainable in practice
to perform inline DGA detection. The per-
formance and robustness of these models is
assessed by exposing them to one day of
real-traffic data as well as domains generated
by adversarial attack algorithms. We found
that the DGA classifiers that rely on both
the domain name and side information have
high performance and are more robust against
adversaries.
I. Introduction
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are
subroutines that generate pseudo-random com-
binations of characters or words, and output
domain name strings [1]. DGAs often use a seed
input such as a number, which is embedded as
part of the code, or a time-based element such as
the system date, time etc., or a combination of
both, to generate random strings. These strings
are then concatenated with an available top
level domain (TLD) to form domain names. The
key idea behind DGAs is to generate the same
set of domain names when executed by two
different machines, such as by a botmaster and
on an infected machine, at a given time. The
botmaster registers one of the generated domain
names, while the infected machines systemati-
cally query the domains from the generated list
until one of them is resolved. The domains from
the list that have not been registered by the
botmaster will typically result in an NXDomain
(non-existent domain) response when queried,
and can be discarded by the infected machine.
This technique is often used by a command and
control (C&C) center and an infected bot to
establish communication and perform malicious
activities as instructed by the C&C server.
Once communication between the infected
machines and the botmaster has been estab-
lished, the C&C server can issue commands to
the bots to perform malicious activities such
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2as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
spamming, stealing sensitive information from
the compromised machines, etc. In the past,
malware authors used a predefined list of domain
names, which was embedded in the malware,
to communicate with the bots. This technique
made it easy for the defenders to blacklist the
malicious domain names and block further com-
munication, effectively rendering the malware
useless. To overcome this, modern C&Cs use
DGAs to randomly generate domain names that
are registered on the go, making them harder
to detect. It is therefore important to identify
the domains generated by DGAs and block them
before they can be used to establish communi-
cation between the bot and the C&C center.
There are several machine learning approaches
proposed in the literature to address this issue
including [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and
other work that we cite later in this paper.
These well known state-of-the-art classifiers can
be deployed in real-world DNS applications to
detect DGA domain names and block them.
While some work focuses on detecting DGAs
from NXDomains [4], our work aims to detect
DGAs from traffic to domains that have already
been resolved.
Commonly used approaches for DGA detec-
tion can be categorized according to how fast
they are able to flag malicious activity in DNS
traffic. As illustrated in table I, some techniques
work in a retrospective manner, in which past
DNS traffic, which is logged over a certain win-
dow, is analyzed in batches to detect anomalies.
Other techniques work inline, meaning that they
can detect DGA domains as soon as they are
queried. There are two ways in which inline
DGA detection can happen:
• The domain first reaches the DGA classifier
and if the classifier flags the domain as benign,
then the query is passed to the DNS resolver
to fetch the resolved IP address of the domain.
However, if the classifier flags the domain as
DGA, then the query will not be forwarded
to the DNS resolver and it simply blocks the
communication with that domain.
• The domain first queries through the DNS
resolver; the DGA classifier uses the features
learned from the DNS response to decide on
whether the domain is DGA or not.
Our work fits into the second category of inline
detection, where both the domain name and the
side information features learned from the DNS
query/response are used by the classifier for
DGA detection. The side information features
are carefully selected to allow inline DGA detec-
tion in the broader sense. In the strict sense, in-
line DGA detection means that the information
required to determine whether a domain name
is DGA or not is available from the DNS query
data alone. A DNS resolver can use the strictly
inline DGA classifier’s decision to determine if
it is safe or not to resolve the query. A less
conventional version of inline detection, which
we refer to as “inline DGA detection in the
broader sense”, is one where data attributes
from DNS responses are required (in addition to
DNS queries). This means that the DNS resolver
must resolve the query first, feed the information
obtained to the DGA classifier, and then use the
DGA classifier’s decision to determine if it is
safe to get the DNS response to the client or
not. As we observe in our experimental results,
taking information from DNS responses into ac-
count improves the ability of DGA classifiers to
correctly detect DGA domains among resolvable
traffic. We note that any dependence on data
requiring queries to additional sources, such as
the WHOIS database (as used for instance in
[10], [11], [12]), would disqualify the approach
from inline detection, even in the broader sense.
Machine learning based approaches to detect
DGA domain names in practice can also be
categorized according to the information they
leverage. One way is to train classifiers to de-
tect DGA domain names using only the do-
main name string itself, see e.g. [4], [5], [6],
[8], [13], [14], [15]. The alternative is to train
the classifiers using context information such as
the IP address of the domain, its geographic
location, attributes from DNS response records
etc. in addition to the domain name [3], [10],
3[16], [17], [18], [12]. In our work, we combine
both approaches. The advantage of the former
approach is that it does not require gathering of
additional information, which may be expensive
to collect in real time, and that it allows the
defenders to detect the DGA domain names and
block them even before they can be resolved.
The advantage of the latter approach is that side
information is a lot harder for the attacker to
manipulate than the domain name string itself,
making machine learning models trained on side
information potentially more robust against ad-
versarial attacks.
Adversarial machine learning is a research
area focused on problems introduced by the use
of machine learning techniques in adversarial
environments in which an intelligent adversary
attempts to exploit the weaknesses in such tech-
niques [19]. The adversarial attacks of interest in
this paper are evasion attacks in which an adver-
sary uses artificially crafted instances, called ad-
versarial samples, that are intentionally used to
mislead a machine learning system and produce
erroneous results. The goal of evasion attacks in
the context of DGA detection is to generate do-
mains that will be labeled as benign by the DGA
classifier. The vulnerability of a classifier against
evasion attacks is measured in terms of DGA
detection rate, which is the proportion of the
adversarial samples predicted as malicious by
the classifier. Lower DGA detection rates indi-
cate high vulnerability of the classifier to the at-
tack. There exists several evasion attacks against
DGA classifiers such as CharBot [20], Deep-
DGA [21], DeceptionDGA [22], MaskDGA [23]
and the DGAs (HMM & PCFG-based) proposed
by [24]. CharBot and MaskDGA are black-box
targeted evasion attacks that do not require any
knowledge about the DGA classifier and are
intended to generate samples that can evade
detection by any classifier. On the other hand,
DeceptionDGA is a white-box attack algorithm
that uses the knowledge of features used by
the DGA classifier to generate evading instances
specific to a given classifier. Both types of at-
tacks are found to be extremely powerful in
generating domains that can evade detection by
the DGA classifiers with high probability.
The main contributions of our work are:
• A comprehensive survey of lexical and side
information features proposed in the literature
on DGA detection.
• An experimental evaluation of the feasibility
in collecting the features and their effective-
ness when deployed for inline detection of
DGAs in real streams of passive DNS traffic,
which leads to a shortlist of features that are
actually beneficial in practice.
• Experimental results that show how the side
information features can make DGA classifiers
more robust against adversarial attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview of related work in the fields
of adversarial machine learning and DGA detec-
tion. Section III provides a detailed overview of
side information features that can be extracted
from DNS traffic to aid in the detection of DGA
domains. In section IV, we list the 26 human
engineered lexical features that are extracted
manually from the domain name string in order
to train the RF classifier for DGA detection.
Section V gives an overview of the different
classifiers we will be studying and attempting to
harden against adversarial attacks. Section VI
describes the experimental setup and reports
all of our empirical results. Finally, section VII
concludes the work.
II. Related Work
Given the importance of being able to de-
tect and block DGA domain related traffic, it
comes as no surprise that the problem of auto-
matic DGA detection has received a consider-
able amount of attention over the last decade.
There are various ways in which existing DGA
detection approaches differ from each other. As
illustrated in table I, DGA detection can be
categorized according to the kind of input that
is required. Some techniques require just the
domain name string, while other techniques re-
quire side information, or a combination of both.
Both kinds of input have their own advantages
4and disadvantages. Methods that rely only on
the domain name string are popular because
side information is typically harder to obtain.
On the other hand, features extracted from side
information are harder to manipulate, making
methods based on them more robust against ad-
versarial attacks. All the approaches presented
in our paper perform inline DGA detection using
domain name only, side information only and
a combination of both domain name & side
information features.
Furthermore, the classifiers can be trained in
two ways to detect if a given domain name is
generated by a DGA or not. The first technique
is the featureful approach, where the classifier
relies on human engineered features extracted
from the domain names. The second technique
is the featureless approach, where the classi-
fier learns the features automatically during
the training process. Classifiers that are based
on deep learning architectures like Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) [5], [8] and Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) models [6], [9]
leverage the featureless approach, whereas mod-
els such as random forests (RFs) adopt the fea-
tureful approach. In our work, we will be using
both featureful and featureless approaches to
train random forest and deep learning classifiers
for DGA detection.
III. side information Features
[{'name':'junebugweddings.com.,', 
  'ttl': 300, 
  'type': 1, 
  'class': 1, 
  'data': '104.27.191.148'}, 
 {'name': 'junebugweddings.com.,', 
  'ttl': 300, 
  'type': 1, 
  'class': 1, 
  'data': '104.27.190.148'}] 
Fig. 1. An example DNS resource record
In this section we provide a detailed overview
of side information features that can be ex-
tracted from DNS traffic to aid in the detection
of DGA domains. An overview of all features is
presented in table II, accompanied by a list of
citations that illustrates the popularity of each
kind of feature in the literature. The order of
the side information features listed in table II
indicates the importance of those features in
DGA detection as ranked by the Random For-
est model (see section V). Not all features are
equally easy to obtain in practice, and their
contribution to the predictive accuracy of DGA
classifiers varies. The last column of table II
indicates whether we retained the feature in
our DGA-classifiers. Figure 1 shows a sample
resource record from which the side information
features are extracted. In figure 1, the attribute
“name” represents the fully qualified domain
name (FQDN), “ttl” represents the time-to-live
of the DNS query, “type” represents the re-
source record type, “class” represents the class
of resource record and “data” represents the
resolved IP address. Below we give a more in-
depth description of each kind of feature, and
its typical use in the the literature on DGA de-
tection. Figure 2 shows a comparison of density
plots for some of the side information features
extracted from benign and DGA domain names,
illustrating their predictive power. The different
side information features are as follows:
• rrlength: This feature measures the length of
the RData field, which is extracted directly
from the DNS response resource record. The
RData in a DNS response encompasses a list
of resolved IP addresses, the time-to-live value
of the query and the type of resource record.
• country: This feature refers to the geographic
location that the resolved IP address maps to.
If the DNS resource record contains multiple
IP addresses, the country for each of the IP
addresses is first identified. If all of the IP
addresses belong to the same country, then
this feature takes up that name. On the other
hand, if any of the IP addresses map to a
different location, then the value of this fea-
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Fig. 2. Comparison of values for side information features extracted from benign and DGA domains
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Domain name string [2], [25] [8], [5], [4], [15], [26][27], [6], [14], [13], [28]
Side information features [29], [30], [16], [31], [32] our work
Domain name string + [18], [33], [3], [34], [35] our workside information features [17], [10], [11], [12]
TABLE I
Overview of existing work on DGA detection
ture would be “multi-valued”. Alternatively,
if the location could not be identified, then
this feature takes the value “unknown”. This
feature is then converted to categorical values
that range between 0 and 185, which means
that the domains in our data set map to
184 different countries plus the values “multi-
valued” and “unknown”.
• ttl: This feature represents the time-to-live
value of the DNS query, which is the time
interval that the resource record can be cached
by the DNS resolver, and is directly obtained
from the DNS response resource record. ta-
ble III compares the distribution of TTL val-
ues (in seconds), in terms of mean, standard
deviation and median, for benign and DGA
domains in our data set (see section VI-A). It
can be seen that DGA domains are in general
far more short-lived than benign domains. For
better visibility in figure 2, the density plot
for TTL values are shown in hours instead of
seconds.
• n ip: This feature indicates the number of
distinct IP addresses that are returned for the
DNS domain lookup. It is manipulated di-
rectly by accessing the list of IPs contained in
the RData field of the DNS response resource
record.
• qtype: This feature represents the DNS query
type that can be extracted from the question
section of the DNS query. Figure 2 shows the
different values for this features in our data
set.
• rtype: This feature represents the resource
record type that can be extracted directly
from the RData field in the DNS response
resource record. Figure 2 shows the different
values for this features in our data set.
• n asn: This feature indicates the number of
distinct autonomous system numbers that the
IP addresses map to. The ASN for a given IP
address is obtained by using Python Geolite2
Maxmind API.1
• subnet: This feature is a boolean value that
represents if all the IP addresses belong to the
same subnet. A value of 0 indicates that one or
more of the IP addresses, returned in the DNS
response, belong to a different subnet and
value of 1 indicates that all the IP addresses
map to the same subnet.
• n countries: This feature represents the dis-
tinct number of countries that the resolved
IP addresses map to. This feature has a very
similar distribution when compared to the
“n asn” feature, which can be observed in
figure 2.
• timestamp: The timestamp denotes the time
at which the DNS query was issued by a host.
This feature in itself may not be useful in de-
tecting DGAs. Some of the past studies record
all of the timestamps at which a particular
domain name was queried and construct time-
series data to analyze the periodicity at which
the benign and DGA domains are queried [17],
[29], whereas [18] computes the lifespan of a
domain by subtracting the first and last seen
timestamps of the domain name. Such ap-
proaches require access to past DNS traffic and
hence are regarded as “retrospective”. Since we
only focus on performing inline DGA detec-
1https://geoip2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
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Benign 109,447 1,421,829 3,600
DGA 29,255 4,701,205 900
TABLE III
TTL distribution (in seconds) for benign and DGA
domains
tion in our work, we do not use the timestamp
feature to perform DGA classification.
• opcode: This feature represents the kind of
query such as standard query, inverse query,
request for server status etc. In our data set,
all the domains being queried belong to stan-
dard query type and hence using this feature
does not contribute in the prediction of DGA
domain names.
• aa: This feature is a boolean flag which rep-
resents if the responding name server is an
authority for the domain name being queried.
The AA flag for all DNS responses in our data
set has the same value “True” and hence we
do not leverage the AA flag information while
training our DGA classifiers.
• qdcount, ancount, nscount, arcount: At
this time, our DNS traffic collector do not cap-
ture this information & hence we do not use
these features to train our model. However, it
can be easily obtained from the DNS query
and resource records.
• rcode: Since our data set comprises of re-
solved domain names only, the rcode remains
“0” for all the samples and hence we discard
this information.
• TTL statistics: This refers to a collec-
tion of features such as standard deviation,
mean, minimum, maximum etc. of all time-to-
live values extracted from the DNS response.
While these features are relevant in a retro-
spective approach that investigates a domain
based on all DNS resource records related to it
say during the past 24 hours, it is not mean-
ingful for fast inline DGA detection. Indeed,
since all of the TTL values in a single response
record have constant values, it would not add
value to include these statistics as features.
• n domains: This feature represents the
number of distinct domain names that are
mapped to a given IP address. In order to
use this feature, one needs to maintain a
bipartite graph that depicts the mapping for
each (domain, IP) pair. Again, this method of
performing graph inference is computationally
intensive and does not contribute towards in-
line detection of DGA domains. Therefore we
refrain from using this side information feature
while training our DGA classifiers.
• n queries: Similar to “timestamp” and
“n domains”, this feature also requires stor-
ing and fetching of information from past DNS
traffic and hence n queries cannot be used for
inline detection of DGAs.
• WHOIS features: Extracting WHOIS
features such as registrar, domain
creation/expiration date etc. involves very
expensive WHOIS queries. This affects the
capability of the classifier to perform inline
DGA detection on-the-go and hence we do
not use any feature that require WHOIS
queries.
IV. Lexical Features
In this section we list the 26 human engineered
lexical features that are extracted manually from
the domain name string in order to train the
RF classifier for DGA detection. Table IV shows
a list of the lexical features used in B-RF and
details on how the feature values are calculated
are given below:
• domain len: This feature represents the
length of the domain name, which is the
number of characters in the SLD.TLD pair.
For example, we refer “google.com” as the
domain name, where “google” indicates the
SLD (second level domain) and “com” indi-
cates the TLD (top level domain). The value of
the feature domain len for the domain name
“google.com” is 10.
• sld len: This feature represents the number
of characters in the second level domain.
• tld len: This feature represents the number
of characters in the top level domain.
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• uni domain: This feature represents the
number of unique characters in the domain
name, after removing special characters such
as ‘.’ & ‘-’ from the domain name.
• uni sld: This feature represents the number
of unique characters in the second level do-
main, after removing special characters such
as ‘.’ & ‘-’ from the SLD.
• uni tld: This feature represents the number
of unique characters in the top level domain,
after removing special characters such as ‘.’ &
‘-’ from the TLD.
• flag dga: This feature represents a boolean
value (0 or 1) that indicates if the domain
name contains any of the following TLDs,
which are known to be frequently associated
with malicious activities2: “study”, “party”,
“click”, “top”, “gdn”, “gq”, “asia”, “cricket”,
“biz”, “cf”.
• tld hash: This feature represents the hash
value of top level domain.
• flag dig: This feature represents a boolean
value that indicates if the domain name starts
with a digit/number (0-9).
• sym: This feature represents the ratio of num-
ber of special characters in the SLD to the
total number of characters in SLD (sld len).
• hex: This feature represents the ratio of num-
ber of hexadecimal characters (0-9 & a-f) in
the SLD to the total number of characters in
the SLD.
• dig: This feature represents the ratio of num-
ber of digits (0-9) in the SLD to the total
number of characters in the SLD.
• vow: This feature represents the ratio of num-
ber of vowels (‘a’, ‘e’, ‘i’, ‘o’, ‘u’) in the SLD
to the total number of characters in the SLD.
• con: This feature represents the ratio of num-
ber of consonants in the SLD to the total
number of characters in the SLD.
• rep char ratio: This feature represents the
ratio of number of characters that occurs more
than once in the SLD to the total number of
unique characters in the SLD.
2https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/
• cons con ratio: This feature represents
the ratio of consecutive consonants (such as
“ct”, “fk”, “ns” etc.) to the length of the
domain (domain len).
• cons dig ratio: This feature represents the
ratio of consecutive digits (such as “92”, “24”,
“75” etc.) to the length of the domain (do-
main len).
• tokens sld: This feature represents the
number of tokens in the SLD, where a token
indicates sequence of characters separated by
‘-’.
• digits sld: This feature represents the total
number of digits in the SLD.
• ent: This feature represents the normalized
entropy value of the characters in SLD and
is calculated using the formula:
ent =
∑n
i=1 pi ∗ log2(pi)
log2(sld len)
where n represents the number of unique char-
acters in the SLD and pi represents the pro-
portion between the frequency of the unique
character ci in the SLD to the total number
of unique characters in the SLD.
• gni: This feature represents the Gini value of
the characters in SLD and is calculated using
the formula:
gni = 1 −
n∑
i=1
p2i
where n represents the number of unique char-
acters in the SLD and pi represents the pro-
portion between the frequency of the unique
character ci in the SLD to the total number
of unique characters in the SLD.
• cer: This feature represents the classification
of error of characters in SLD, which is com-
puted using the formula:
cer = 1 − max
i=1,...,n
pi
where pi represents the proportion between
the frequency of the unique character ci in the
SLD to the total number of unique characters
in the SLD.
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• 2gram med: This feature represents the me-
dian of 2-gram frequencies in SLD.
• 3gram med: This feature represents the me-
dian of 3-gram frequencies in SLD.
• 2gram cmed: In order to compute this
feature, the SLD of the domain is concate-
nated again with the SLD. (i.e) For exam-
ple, if “google” is the SLD, a string such as
“googlegoogle” is formed. The 2gram med is
then calculated on this newly formed string
“googlegoogle” to obtain the value of this
feature.
• 3gram cmed: In order to compute this fea-
ture, the SLD of the domain is concatenated
again with the SLD. (i.e) For example, if
“yahoo” is the SLD, a string such as “ya-
hooyahoo” is formed. The 3gram med is then
calculated on this newly formed string “ya-
hooyahoo” to obtain the value of this feature.
V. DGA Classifiers
We consider three different DGA classifiers
in this work, which we detail below. We chose
one model representative of the featureful ap-
proach (B-RF), one deep learning model which
represents the featureless approach (LSTM.MI)
and finally a hybrid model which combines both
approaches (LSTM.MI+B-RF).
A. B-RF
B-RF is a DGA classifier based on random
forests. It consists of 100 trees and each tree is
trained using a subset of the feature space to
avoid overfitting. Entropy is used as the criterion
to decide the split attribute while growing the
trees in the random forest. There are 3 variants
of B-RF classifier, each trained either on lexical
features (as the RF classifier in [14]) or DNS
features, or a combination of both lexical and
DNS features. The performance of these variants
of the B-RF classifier is listed in the first 3 rows
of table VI.
B. LSTM.MI
Woodbridge et al. [5] were the first to propose
deep learning for DGA domain name detection.
Their DGA classifier is a neural network con-
sisting of an embedding layer, an LSTM layer,
and a single node output layer with sigmoid
activation. In this paper, we use the LSTM.MI
model that was proposed recently by Tran et
al. [8]. Its architecture is very similar to that
of Woodbridge et al. [5]; the main distinction is
that the LSTM.MI model is trained with a cost-
sensitive learning algorithm that takes class im-
balances into account. This allows the LSTM.MI
approach to achieve slightly better results than
the original LSTM approach (see [8], [14]). The
4th row in table VI shows the performance of
the LSTM.MI classifier. It operates directly on
the domain name string, instead of on lexical
features extracted from it. Characters in the
domain name are converted to lower case and are
encoded with categorical values, ranging from
1 to 38, to represent ‘.’, ‘-’, digits from 0 to 9
& characters from ‘a’ to ‘z’. All the domains in
our data are fixed to a length of 77 characters,
which is the length of the longest domain name
in our data set. Domains that are shorter than
77 characters are padded with zeroes in the left.
C. LSTM.MI+B-RF
The hybrid LSTM.MI+B-RF classifier com-
bines both LSTM.MI and B-RF architectures by
training a B-RF classifier with features listed
in tables II and IV, in addition to the confi-
dence score obtained from the LSTM.MI model
for that domain name. The confidence score
ranges between 0 and 1, signifying the proba-
bility of the domain being a DGA as predicted
by the LSTM.MI classifier. The above workflow
of DGA detection using LSTM.MI+B-RF setup
is depicted in figure 3. The last two rows in
table VI represent the performance of this DGA
classifier.
VI. Experimental results
A. Dataset
In the first experiment, we train and eval-
uate the DGA classifiers from section V on
a dataset with 600,000 DGAs (positive) and
12
Fig. 3. DGA detection using LSTM.MI + RF model
600,000 benign (negative) samples. Table V
shows some examples of DGA & benign do-
mains. The training data points originate from
a real-time stream of passive DNS data, con-
sisting of roughly 10-12 billion DNS queries per
day collected from subscribers including ISPs
(Internet Service Providers), schools, and busi-
nesses. From this traffic, the positive samples
are collected by retaining resolved domain names
that are listed in DGArchive3, a blacklist con-
taining known DGA domains [1]. Dictionary
DGAs, which are human-readable DGA domains
belonging to malware families such as suppobox,
gozi, matsnu and nymaim2 are discarded from
the training set. This is because these DGAs
look more like benign domains and confuse the
DGA classifiers [25]. Since this work is primarily
aimed at measuring the impact of adversarial
instances such as CharBot, we exclude samples
from Dictionary DGAs. The benign samples are
collected based on a predefined set of heuristics
as listed below:
• Domain name should have valid DNS charac-
ters only (digits, letters, dot and hyphen)
• Domain has to be resolved at least once for
every day between June 01, 2019 and July 31,
2019.
• Domain name should have a valid public suffix
• Characters in the domain name are not all
digits (after removing ‘.’ and ‘-’)
• Domain should have at most four labels (La-
bels are sequence of characters separated by a
3https://dgarchive.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/
dot)
• Length of the domain name is at most 255
characters
• Longest label is between 7 and 64 characters
• Longest label is more than twice the length of
the TLD
• Longest label is more than 70% of the com-
bined length of all labels
• Excludes IDN (International Distribution Net-
work) domains (such as domains starting with
xn--)
• Domain must not exist in DGArchive
Both the DGA and benign domains in the
data set are collected from real-time passive
DNS traffic that was observed in February 2019.
The domains in the data set are then prepro-
cessed by following the two steps mentioned
below:
• Retain only the SLD & TLD of the domain
name and discard any 3LD (third level do-
main) or any other label if present. For exam-
ple, for the domain name “www.google.com”,
the 3LD which is “www” is removed and the
SLD.TLD which “google.com” is retained.
• All the alphabetical characters in the domain
name are converted to its corresponding lower
case characters.
B. Performance evaluation of DGA classifiers
The true positive rate (TPR) and false pos-
itive rate (FPR) for the DGA classifiers are
calculated as follows:
TPR = TPTP + FN , FPR =
FP
FP + TN
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Benign domains (labeled 0) DGA domains (labeled 1)
7ft4.com vocom.eu
sgtobel.ch leadhelp.net
intimvoronezh.net 1b6a95e6b5d4.com
essc-tabriz.com korpncyeajsgeatkopoqs.info
konsaltbezopasnost.ru kndydusmrlrofrcmfuayfmswrkytl.biz
TABLE V
Some examples fo benign vs DGA domain names
where TP, TN, FP & FN represent the number
of true positives, true negatives, false positives
and false negatives respectively. The predictive
performance of the classifiers is evaluated using
5-fold cross-validation for metrics such as TPR
and Area Under the Receiver Operating Char-
acteristic (ROC) Curve (AUC) as tabulated in
table VI. In cybersecurity applications, it is
important to achieve high TPR for a very low
FPR. This is because it is undesirable to block
a large number of benign domains in real-world
traffic as this interferes with users’ legitimate
business. Hence all the reported metrics are
thresholded at a very low FPR of 0.1%. We
also obtain the ROC curve by plotting the TPR
against the FPR of the classifiers and the AUC
is subsequently obtained by taking the integral
of the ROC curve. The AUC is a measure of
how well the trained classifier can distinguish
between the classes. Specifically, it can be in-
terpreted as the probability that the classifier
will output a higher score for a randomly chosen
DGA domain than it would for a randomly
chosen benign domain. An ideal classifier has
an AUC score of 1, indicating it will always
rank DGA domains higher than benign domains.
This makes it possible to use the classifier to
perfectly separate the classes via an appropriate
threshold on its output scores. A classifier that
just randomly guesses the outcome achieves an
AUC of 0.5 and a classifier with AUC 0 has
basically inverted all predictions, i.e. samples
labeled as 0 are predicted as 1 by the classifier
and vice versa. In addition to the AUC score, the
AUC at a fixed FPR of 0.1% is also reported.
This thresholded AUC represents the integral of
the ROC curve for a FPR of 0 to 0.001.
There are several interesting observations to
be made based on table VI. First, looking
at the AUC@1%FPR column, one can see
that the predictive performance for inline DGA
detection based on DNS features alone does
not perform well: the B-RF/DNS based model
achieves an AUC@1%FPR of only 53.23%. Sec-
ond, when it comes to DGA detection based
on the domain string alone, the deep learn-
ing approach (LSTM.MI) clearly outperforms
the random forest approach (B-RF/Lexical) at
94.47% vs. 89.78%. This is fully in line with
previous findings [8], [27]. Third, the most inter-
esting and novel result from table VI is that the
DGA classifiers, when trained with both lexical
and side information features, have the best
overall performance in terms of AUC score and
TPR, namely 99.17% for the architecture from
figure 3.
C. Real Traffic Analysis
Next, we apply the best performing classifiers
in table VI on one day of real traffic DNS traffic
to evaluate their predictive performance in real-
time. We collected a set of resolved domains that
were observed on March 26, 2019 to perform
this analysis. As part of pre-processing, the fully
qualified domain names are validated against the
heuristics mentioned in section VI-A, in order
to maintain consistency with the training data
set. The domains that satisfy the heuristics are
then retained in this experiment after discarding
the third level domain (3LD/subdomain) from
the domain name, if present. This resulted in
a set consisting of 66,440,681 domains (con-
tains duplicate domains with SLD.TLD pairs),
out of which 1,159,662 domains were found
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Model Features
Performance metrics
AUC@ TPR@
0.1%FPR 0.1%FPR
B-RF
DNS 53.23% 16.21%
Lexical 89.78% 97.44%
DNS + Lexical 98.19% 99.42%
LSTM.MI Domain name string 94.47% 98.80%
LSTM.MI + B-RF Domain name string + DNS 96.51% 99.89%Domain name string + DNS + Lexical 99.17% 99.91%
TABLE VI
Performance evaluation of DGA classifiers using 5-fold cross-validation
in DGArchive and 14,653,217 domains were
found in Alexa. There is also an overlap of
1,124,467 domains between the Alexa whitelist
and DGArchive blacklist.
Table VII shows a comparison of the number
of domains that were flagged as DGA by the
LSTM.MI, B-RF and LSTM.MI+B-RF classi-
fier. The B-RF model (in table VII) has the high-
est true positive rate among the 3 models being
compared. Out of the 1.87M domains flagged as
DGA by the classifier, approximately 61% were
found in DGArchive. Although the LSTM.MI
classifier catches the highest number of DGAs in
real-traffic, the true positive rate is 34% which
is 27% lower than the B-RF classifier. However,
as seen in the last row of table VII, the B-RF
also has the highest number of false positives.
This could be due to the fact that there is a
large number of overlapping domains between
Alexa and DGArchive as mentioned earlier in
this section. A good workaround to reduce the
number of false positives during the deployment
is to check the flagged domains against Alexa
before making the final decision.
D. Defense against Adversarial ML
The use of side information is important in
the context of adversarial ML because side in-
formation is a lot harder to manipulate than
the domain name string itself [10]. In order to
test this, we generated 1,000 DGA domains with
CharBot [20], a simple DGA algorithm that
was written specifically to evade existing DGA
classifiers. Since, to the best of our knowledge,
CharBot has not been deployed yet in the wild,
we cannot collect side information for CharBot
domains from real traffic. Instead, we pair up
the CharBot domains with the DNS features
obtained from 1,000 randomly sampled DGA
domains in real traffic. To avoid any bias in the
selection of DNS features for CharBot domains,
we perform the random sampling for 5 trials
and create 5 sets of CharBot DNS features.
The lexical features extracted for CharBot are
appended with the DNS features, which can then
be exposed to DGA classifiers for detection of
malicious domains. The idea here is to test if
the DGA classifiers trained on side information
features are successful in detecting CharBot do-
mains.
Table VIII shows the CharBot detection rate,
which is the average proportion of CharBot
domains that were flagged as DGA by the
classifiers over the 5 randomized trials. Higher
values of CharBot detection rate indicates that
the classifier is more robust against new DGAs
or adversarial attacks. As expected, the B-RF
model trained on both lexical and side informa-
tion features detects 20% of CharBot domains
as DGA/malicious, which is 12% more than the
LSTM.MI model. This clearly indicates that the
use of side information features to train the
DGA classifier makes it more robust against
adversarial samples like CharBot domains, when
compared to classifiers that rely only on the
domain name for DGA detection.
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Model LSTM.MI B-RF LSTM.MI+B-RF
Features Domain name DNS + Lexical Domain name +DNS + Lexical
Out of the ∼66M domains in real-traffic,
3,400,017 1,877,784 2,170,056number of domains flagged as DGA
by the classifier
Out of the domains flagged as DGA
1,151,750 1,149,689 1,150,116by the classifier,
number of domains found in DGArchive
Out of the domains flagged as DGA
1,626,232 1,717,638 1,420,319by the classifier,
number of domains found in Alexa
TABLE VII
Real traffic analysis of DGA classifiers on 66,440,662 (∼66M) domains
Classifier Features DGA (CharBot) detection rate
B-RF
DNS 1.70 % ± 0.24 %
Lexical 3.80 % ± 0.0 %
Lexical + DNS 20.06 % ± 0.56 %
LSTM.MI Domain name string 8.00 % ± 0.0 %
LSTM.MI+B-RF Domain name string + DNS 14.98 % ± 0.63 %Domain name string + Lexical + DNS 15.76 % ± 0.53 %
TABLE VIII
Detection rate of CharBot domains as DGA
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and evaluated
state-of-the-art classifiers for inline DGA
detection using side information features that
are easily obtained from DNS query and
response. Results from tables VI and VIII
show that using side information in addition to
the domain name to train classifiers not only
improves the predictive performance, but also
makes it more robust against adversaries like
CharBot, when compared to the classifiers that
use just the domain name to detect DGAs.
Additionally, the side information features in
our approach are carefully chosen to perform
lightweight inline detection of DGA domains,
and do not rely on external sources such as
WHOIS for feature extraction.
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